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Abstract. Th e paper argues against what I call the “Fregean interpretation” of Peirce’s 
distinction between the immediate and the dynamic object of a sign, according to 
which Peirce’s dynamic object is akin to Frege’s Bedeutung, while Peirce’s immediate 
object is akin to Frege’s Sinn. Aft er having exposed the Fregean interpretation, I briefl y 
reconstruct the genesis of Peirce’s notion of immediate object in his semiotic writings 
of the years 1904–1909 and defend the view that, according to Peirce, only propositions 
have immediate objects.
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Th is paper argues against the standard, “Fregean” interpretation of Peirce’s distinction 
between the immediate and the dynamic object of a sign. In brief, according to such 
a view the dynamic object corresponds to the Fregean Bedeutung of the sign – the 
object denoted or referred to by the sign, while the immediate object corresponds to the 
Fregean Sinn – the way the sign presents, captures, or represents the dynamic object. 
Th e Fregean interpretation has been proposed explicitly and implicitly in classic and 
recent scholarship, and is largely considered correct or at least a good approximation 
to Peirce’s philosophical intentions.
I will argue that the Fregean interpretation does not fi t the use that Peirce makes 
of the immediate/dynamic object distinction in his experiments with the classifi cation 
of signs in the years 1904–1906. It is a fact that the distinction in question emerges 
around 1904 in the context of the classifi cations. And it is a fact that with the notion 
of immediate object Peirce succeeds in establishing, besides the trichotomy of icon, 
index and symbol obtained with the dynamic object (or object tout court before 1904) – 
a new and diff erent trichotomy of signs, which would remain a relatively constant 
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item in all his subsequent taxonomic attempts (1904–1909). Th is new trichotomy is 
into vague signs, singular signs, and general signs, that is, into particular, singular, and 
universal propositions. It follows that the division “according to the immediate object” 
that recurs in Peirce’s speculative grammar (1904–1906) is a division of propositions 
according to their quantity. Th ere is a sense in which only propositions and proposition-
like signs have immediate objects.
Section 1 exposes the Fregean interpretation. Section 2 briefl y reconstructs the 
genesis of Peirce’s notion of immediate object in his semiotic writings of the years 
1904–1908. Section 3 defends the view that, according to Peirce, only propositions 
have immediate objects.1
1. Gottlob Frege distinguished between the Bedeutung (reference) and the Sinn 
(sense) of a Zeichen (sign) in his celebrated 1892 essay “Über Sinn und Bedeutung”. 
Th is distinction was foreshadowed in the Begriff sschrift , where he had spoken 
of a same content (Inhalt) being given by two diff erent modes of determination 
(Bestimmungsweisen) (Frege 1879, § 8). Here is how he presents the distinction in the 
1892 essay:
It is natural, now, to think of there being connected with a sign (name, combination 
of words, letter), besides that to which the sign refers, which may be called the 
reference (Bedeutung) of the sign, also what I should like to call the sense (Sinn) of 
the sign, wherein the mode of presentation is contained. (Frege 1960: 57)
Th e expressions “3 + 4” and “2 + 5” have the same denotation (Bedeutung) but express 
diff erent senses (Sinne), that is, diff erent ways of presenting the same number. In 
Frege’s geometrical example, the expressions “the point of intersection of a and b” 
and “the point of intersection of b and c” have the same Bedeutung (the point o), while 
their Sinne diff er. Likewise, in the famous astronomical example the Bedeutung of 
‘the evening star’ and of ‘the morning star’ is the same (Venus), but their Sinne are 
diff erent. Th e distinction is not restricted to proper names, but also embraces common 
nouns and sentences (1960: 62–65), the Bedeutung of a sentence being its truth-value. 
Th is distinction is a well-established one in contemporary philosophy of language.2
Now, the Peircean distinction between the immediate and the dynamic objects of a 
sign has oft en been taken to account for something similar to the Fregean distinction 
1 Th e following abbreviations will be used for Peirce’s works: CP, followed by volume and 
paragraph number, stands for Peirce 1931–1958; NEM, followed by volume and page number, 
for Peirce 1976; SS, followed by page number, for Peirce 1977; MS, followed by Robin catalogue 
number and, when available, page number, for the unpublished manuscripts in the Houghton 
Library of Harvard University, as cataloged in Robin 1967.
2 See e.g. Beaney 1996, Ch. 6; Macbeth 2005, Ch. 4.
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between Sinn and Bedeutung. A champion of the Fregean interpretation is Umberto 
Eco. Eco (1976: 1462) suggests that “the immediate object seems to be defi ned as the 
manner in which the sign circumscribes the way of looking at the object from the 
point of view of a given sign’s focus (something similar to Frege’s Sinn as opposed 
to Bedeutung)”. In Lector in fabula (1979) Eco goes to great pains to disentangle and 
clarify several of Peirce’s semiotic notions. According to him, ground, interpretant 
and meaning, although “diff erent formal objects of diff erent semiotic approaches 
and according to diff erent points of view” (Eco 1979: 32), are in fact one and the 
same thing. Th e immediate object is similarly said to be the “meaning” of the sign: 
“signs only ‘know’ Immediate Objects, namely meanings” (Eco 1979: 44). For Eco, it 
is the notion of ground which serves to distinguish the dynamic from the immediate 
object of a sign; the immediate object “is the manner in which the Dynamic Object is 
focalized, this manner being nothing else than the ground or meaning” (Eco 1979: 31).
Th e Fregean interpretation of Peirce’s distinction has recently been proposed 
explicitly by Gérard Deledalle: “According to Frege, a sign (Zeichen) ‘stands for’ 
(bedeutet) its objects in exactly the same way as the sign represents its object for 
Peirce. Moreover, it has for Frege as for Peirce, two objects: a dynamical or referential 
object (Bedeutung) and an immediate object or sense (Sinn)” (Deledalle 2000: 139). 
Also Atkin (2008: 72) speaks of an “obvious analogy” between Frege’s Bedeutung/Sinn 
distinction and Peirce’s dynamic/immediate object distinction: “Frege, for instance, 
takes a sign’s Bedeutung to be the object for which it stands; similarly, for Peirce, the 
dynamic object is the real object signifi ed by the sign”; Frege’s Sinn and “the immediate 
object look like bedfellows. And indeed, many of the key theses that hold of Fregean 
Sense seem to hold of the Peircian Immediate Object” (Atkin 2008: 73). 
An immediate corollary of the Fregean interpretation is that immediate objects 
are accumulative: “[t]he form that we attribute to the Dynamic Object is continuously 
changed through the formulation of Immediate Objects and their constant redefi nition 
by successive interpretants” (Eco 1984: 45); “one immediate object builds upon the 
next as a semiotic chain tends towards a fi nal end” (Atkin 2008: 73). Since, according 
to this interpretation, the immediate object is one of the possible ways in which a 
sign “captures” (intensionally) the dynamic object, several immediate objects might 
correspond to the same dynamic object, none of which excludes the others. Let the 
historical G. W. Leibniz be the dynamic object. Th en, the portrait of Leibniz made by 
Christoph Bernhard Francke, the statue of Leibniz in the University of Leipzig, and 
the image of Leibniz on a German postage stamp would be three diff erent ways of 
representing the same dynamic object. Each represents the dynamic object diff erently, 
and, accordingly, has a diff erent meaning: the portrait may be said to focus on the 
colour of the skin; the statue may be said to emphasize the proportions of Leibniz’s 
body; the stamp may be said to capture the essence of Leibniz’s eyes. Each of these 
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aspects is (what Peirce has sometimes called) the ground of a particular representation 
of the dynamic object. Each of them is a partial and perspectival representation of the 
dynamic object. Immediate objects, Sinne, meanings, are therefore accumulative: to 
what the portrait represents we might add what the statue represents, and to this we 
might add what the stamp represents. Th e ideal sum of all these diff erent, perspectival 
immediate objects would approximate the dynamic object, the historical Leibniz. I 
am sure that many conscious or unconscious supporters of the Fregean interpretation 
would substantially agree with this description of Peirce’s position.
Now, a fi rst, obvious objection to the Fregean interpretation is that for Frege a 
Zeichen may have a Sinn without having a Bedeutung; ‘Odysseus’ in “Odysseus was 
set ashore at Ithaca while sound asleep” has a Sinn (arguably, a defi nite description), 
but no Bedeutung (Frege 1960: 62–63). So for Frege “in grasping a sense, one is not 
certainly assured of a reference” (1960: 58). Th e sign may name a fi ctional character, 
one which has no existence but in the world of fi ction or imagination; in this case, 
the sign has a sense, but no a reference. If the parallelism were consistent, we should 
likewise expect that for Peirce any proper name like Odysseus or Hamlet would have 
an immediate object, but no dynamic object. Th is, however, is by no means Peirce’s 
position:
[...] the Dynamical, or Genuine Object. It is misleading to call it the real object, 
since it maybe unreal. (Logic Notebook, MS 339, 279r, 1906)
We must distinguish between the Immediate Object, – i.e. the Object as represented 
in the sign, – and the Real (no, because perhaps the Object is altogether fi ctive, I 
must choose a diff erent term, therefore), say rather the Dynamical Object. (Peirce 
to James, CP 8.314, 1909)
Whether the object of a sign exists in the actual world or just in Shakespeare’s world, 
Peirce would nonetheless speak of the dynamic, not of the immediate object of that 
sign.3 Whatever the universe of discourse, the object referred to or represented is the 
dynamic, not the immediate object. In Fregean terms, for Peirce all signs, even signs of 
non-existent objects, have a Bedeutung: ‘Barack Obama’ has a Bedeutung in the actual 
world, ‘Hamlet’ only in Shakespeare’s world. Th is discrepancy alone is suffi  cient to 
undermine confi dence in the Fregean interpretation.
In what is certainly the best book on Peirce’s theory of signs we fi nd a variant of 
the Fregean interpretation, which may be called the “stoic interpretation”. According 
to Sextus, the Stoics claimed that in language “three things are  linked together: 
what is signifi ed (τὸ σημαινόμενον), that which signifi es (τὸ σημαῖνον), and the object 
3 Bergman (2008: 105) agrees: “the dynamical object may be altogether unreal in the ordinary 
sense of the word”.
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of reference (τὸ τυγχάνον)” (Ad. Math. VIII, 11–12).4 Th at which is signifi ed is also 
described as the “sayable” (λεκτόν). T. Short explicitly draws a parallel between the 
Stoics’ λεκτόν and Peirce’s immediate object:
Peirce’s distinction between a sign’s immediate object and its dynamic object was 
more clear, more constant, and less original than were his divisions of interpretants. 
It goes back to the Stoic distinction […] between the object as represented, or lekton – 
the immediate object – and the object as it exists independently of its representation – 
the dynamic object. If I say, ‘my mother’, and my father says, ‘my wife’, the object of 
these two expressions is the same in herself but is represented diff erently as mother 
of the one and as wife of the other. You could apprehend the object as represented in 
either expression without knowing that it is the same person. (Short 2007: 179–180)
Th e evident problem with Short’s stoic interpretation is that for the Stoics a complete 
λεκτόν has a propositional size: “they [the Stoics] defi ne the proposition as a complete 
λεκτόν that is assertoric (i.e., true or false) in itself” (e.g., “Dion is walking”, S. E., Pyrrh. 
Hyp. II, 104–106). But there are also incomplete λεκτά, like predicates and the like (e.g., 
“is walking”, cf. Diog. Laert. VII, 63). In Short’s example, “my mother” and “my wife” 
would count as such incomplete or fragmentary λεκτά, because neither expresses a 
complete sense capable of truth-value. Th is is true also for Frege: both concepts and 
sentences have a Sinn, although a concept has an unsaturated Sinn, while a sentence 
has a saturated Sinn.5 
Th ose interested in the stoic interpretation should then inquire whether there is 
or should be a parallel distinction in Peirce between a complete and an incomplete 
immediate object of a sign, and whether such a distinction is used to account for the 
saturated/unsaturated contrast. Now, Peirce does use the chemical metaphor and 
speaks of complete and incomplete signs,6 that is, complete, saturated propositions and 
incomplete, unsaturated rhemes. But he never says, for instance, that propositions have 
a complete immediate object while rhemes have only an incomplete immediate object – 
as the stoic interpretation, if followed only a little further than Short actually does, 
inevitably suggests. Th e distinction proposition/rheme – upon which Peirce in fact put 
4 On the Stoics’ theory of language and doctrine of sign-inference see Manetti 1987, Ch. 6.
5 Cf. Gaskin 2008: 128–130. Benson Mates (1953: 19–21) has drawn an analogy between the 
Stoic concept of λεκτόν and Frege’s notion of Sinn.
6 “a sign may be complex; and the parts of a sign, though they are signs, may not possess all 
the essential characters of a more complete sign” (MS 7, 1, c. 1903); “the complete Repre sentamen 
represents the Object, not only as the sign of which it is the copy does, but also independently and 
generally vaguely in a second Representamen” (R 478, variant draft  of p. 43, 1903); “[i]n addition 
however to denoting objects every sign suffi  ciently complete signifi es characters, or qualities” 
(NEM 4: 239, 1904); “a complete sign has or may have Parts which partake of the nature of their 
whole; but oft en in a truncated fashion” (MS 277, c. 1907; my emphasis, F. B.) 
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much emphasis and which he obtains through the classifi cation – is not obtained by a 
typology of immediate objects, but by the presence in the sign of an immediate object, 
as I will explain in Section 3. A diff erent typology of immediate objects exists, and 
is indeed intended to distinguish not between propositions and rhemes, but among 
diff erent kinds of proposition, as I will explain in Section 2.
Th e Fregean interpretation seems to manifest the following two defects: (1) Frege’s 
Sinn/Bedeutung and Peirce’s immediate/dynamic object distinctions do not match 
in the case of non-existing objects; (2) Peirce does not distinguish between complete 
and incomplete immediate objects, but between complete and incomplete signs. Both 
(1) and (2) are the result of pushing the Frege-Peirce analogy only little further; but 
both are only superfi cial manifestations of a presupposition that lies at the root of 
both the Fregean and the stoic interpretations: that the immediate object of a sign has 
something to do with the “meaning” of that sign, whatever “meaning” might mean 
in Peirce’s vocabulary. Th is view is best expressed by Joseph Ransdell (2007): “Th e 
dynamical object is ‘the thing itself,’ transcending any given cognition though not 
beyond cognition generally, whereas the immediate object is the thing as immanent 
in semeiosis, the thing as it appears to be (is thought to be)”.7 Th is assumption is 
also present in Eco’s and Short’s accounts. But as Frederik Stjernfelt (2014: 98) has 
persuasively argued, the immediate object has nothing to do with the meaning of 
the sign: “neither the Immediate Object nor the Dynamic Object is concerned with 
descriptive characters – this is left  to the meaning categories. Both deal with the 
identity of reference”. It is true that there are passages in which Peirce speaks of 
the representative8 and ideal9 nature of the immediate object. But he is on the other 
hand equally clear that the “meaning” or “descriptive content” of a sign resides in its 
interpretant, not in its object, be it dynamic or immediate.10 Th at the immediate object 
has a representative nature does not imply that it is to be taken for the meaning of the 
sign, whatever “meaning” is for Peirce. As he explains to Lady Welby, 
7 Ransdell, Joseph 2007. “On the use and abuse of the immediate/dynamical object 
distinction”, Arisbe Eprint. (http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/
useabuse.htm, accessed March 31, 2015.)
8 “Prolegomena”, CP 4.536, 1906.
9 “Th is requaesitum I term the Object of the sign; – the immediate object, if it be the idea 
which the sign is built upon, the real object, if it be that real thing or circumstance upon which 
that idea is founded as on bed-rock” (MS 318, 1907). Th is passage has suggested to Helmut 
Pape (1990: 382) that the immediate object is “just the idea of an object to which the sign gives 
rise”, which is almost literally the defi nition that Peirce gives of the interpretant of a sign. Th e 
sign “Hamlet was mad” is build on Hamlet as its subject, or at least on the idea that we have of 
Hamlet, for otherwise the sign would not functions as such; while the sign itself conveys the 
further idea of madness as applicable to the object, or to our idea of it.
10 “Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism”, CP 5.165, 179, 1903; “Pragmatism”, MS 318, 14–15.
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signifi cation is only one of the two chief functions of signs; as the elegant and 
correct John of Salisbury notices, in referring to “quod fere in omnium ore celebre 
est, aliud scilicet esse quod appellativa signifi cant, et aliud esse quod nominant. 
Nominantur singularia, sed universalia signifi cantur.” (Metalogicus II. xx. I copy 
from the ed. of 1620.) (CP 8.378)
A sign both denotes and connotes, nominat et signifi cat. It denotes its object and 
signifi es its interpretant. It says something, and also indicates that of which it says 
what it says. It may be thought that the dynamic object corresponds to what the sign 
nominat, while the immediate object corresponds to what the sign signifi cat. Mats 
Bergman (2008: 86) suggests something along these lines:
Peirce does acknowledge the fact that the utterer not only identifi es and delimits 
the subject of discourse, but typically asserts something about that topic or at least 
presents it in a certain way; this aspect of saying something about something in 
some manner is conceptualized as the immediate object in distinction from the 
dynamical object that encompasses identifi cation and demarcation. 
I perfectly agree that Peirce acknowledges the fact that signs both denote and connote. 
But I disagree that the immediate object conceptualizes the connotative side of semiosis: 
both dynamic and immediate objects are on the denotative side. What follows outlines 
the main reasons I have found to support the view that the immediate object is that 
part of a sign that denotes the dynamic object.
2. Th e distinction between the immediate and the dynamic objects is a relatively late 
product of Peirce’s semiotic enterprise. It seems to emerge in 1904. Th e nearest Peirce 
came to some such distinction before 1904 is in the fi rst version of speculative grammar 
of the Syllabus (MS 478, 43–105), where Peirce “deduces” the bi-partite structure of 
the proposition (dicisign) from its Aristotelian defi nition as bearer of truth-value. 
Peirce distinguishes a primary object, the object represented, and a secondary object, 
the manner the sign is represented by its interpretant to represent the primary object. 
In the case of dicisigns, this manner is indexicality, so the dicisign is represented to 
be an index of its primary object, this indexical relation being the secondary object. 
Th e purpose of the “maze of these abstractions”11 is to show that since a dicisign is 
represented as an index, it must also have the bi-partite structure of an index, i.e. must 
have two parts. One of these parts stands for the (primary) object, the other for the 
dicisign itself; they are called subject and predicate of the dicisign, respectively. Th e 
primary object is the object external to the sign; the secondary object – Peirce says in 
MS 478 – is the way the sign is represented as representing its object. 
11 CP 2.312. But see Stjernfelt 2014.
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All this disappears from the second version of speculative grammar that Peirce 
writes for the Syllabus (“Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations”, MS 540) 
and which was probably intended to replace the former, had it ever reached print. In 
“Nomenclature and Divisions” there is no talk of more than one object. Th e three 
trichotomies come from the sign’s relation to itself (qualisign, sinsign, qualisign), 
to its unique object (icon, index, symbol), and to its interpretant (rheme, dicisign, 
argument).12 
Immediate objects fi rst appear in a letter to Lady Welby from October 1904. Peirce 
here defi nes a sign as “an object which is in relation to its object on the one hand and to 
an interpretant on the other in such a way as to bring the interpretant into a relation to 
the object corresponding to its own relation to the object” (SS, 32). He then says that a 
sign has two objects and three interpretants, and that therefore signs are to be divided 
according to their own material qualities (qualisign, sinsign, legisign), according to 
their relations to their dynamic object (icon, index, symbol), to their immediate object 
(sign of quality, of an existent, or of a law), to their dynamic interpretant (submitted, 
urged, contemplated), to their immediate interpretant (thoughts, experiences, qualities 
of feelings) and to their signifi cate interpretant (rheme, dicent, argument) (SS 32–35). 
Th is adds three further trichotomies to the initial three of the Syllabus, with a total 
of six (Fig. 1).
Peirce does nothing in the letter to explain what he means with the new trichotomy 
“sign of quality, existent, or law” relative to the immediate object. At least, this 
trichotomy does not correspond to the fi rst one (qualisign, sinsign, legisign). It is not 
even much clearer what the new trichotomy of “interpretable in thoughts, interpretable 
in experiences, interpretable in qualities of feelings” relative to the immediate 
interpretant should mean. Th e trichotomy relative to the dynamic interpretant 
may have been intended to distinguish, e.g. the propositional content (proposition 
contemplated) from the act of assertion of that content (proposition urged).13 One 
thing is evident, however: Peirce’s distinction between the dynamic and the immediate 
object is motivated by the classifi cation of signs. Th e distinction has a grammatical or 
taxonomic purpose: it is needed to classify things. But we do not yet see what those 
things are which are thereby classifi ed.
12 In “Καινὰ Στοιχεῖα” (1904) he speaks of the “real object” of a symbol (NEM 4.258) and of 
its “immediate interpretant” (NEM 4.261), but not of the immediate object. 
13 Th is has been explained by Short (2007: 151–153). As Short notes, if we further specify the 
kind of urging by additional divisions (whether the sign or proposition is urged assertively, 
imperatively, interrogatively, etc.), we can arrive at a semiotic a priori classifi cation of speech 
acts. Th is is what Peirce later does with the notion of ‘pheme’ (MS 295, 26, 1906). See also 
Bellucci 2014.
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“Nomenclature and Divisions of Triad Relations” Peirce to L. Welby, Oct. 1904
Syllabus MS540 Fall 1903 SS pp. 32–35
•  the sign’s relation to itself •  the sign’s relation to itself 
 (qualisign, signsign, qualisign)  (qualisign, signsign, qualisign)
•   to its object •   to its object dynamic 
 (icon, index, symbol)  (icon, index, symbol)
  •   to its immediate object
   (sign of quality, of an existent, 
   or of a law)
•  to its interpretant •   to its interpretant signifi ed 
 (rheme, dicisign, argument)  (rheme, dicisign, argument)
  •   to its dynamic interpretant
   (submitted, urged, contemplated)
  •  to its immediate interpretant 
   (thoughts, experiences, qualities 
   of feelings)
Figure 1. Th e three trichotomies of 1903 and the six of 1904.
Proceeding chronologically, some clues comes from a remark noted in the Logic 
Notebook in June 1905: “I use the terms immediate and direct, not according to their 
etymologies but so that to say that A is immediate to B means that it is present in B” 
(MS 339, 243v, 1 June 1905). “Immediate to” means “present in”: to say that an object 
A is immediate to a sign B is to say that object A is present in sign B. Th e immediate 
object is present in the sign, while the real or dynamic object is not present in the sign 
in the same sense, but “to be present in a sign” can mean nothing else than “to be part 
of a sign”. Th us, the immediate object is part of the sign of which it is the immediate 
object. Th e real or dynamic object is not part of the sign in this sense.
A slightly later remark in the Notebook dispels the fog: a sign in relation to its 
immediate object is either vague, actual, or general.
A sign is a Priman which is Secundan to an Object and is Tertian in determining an 
Interpretant into Secundanity to that Object. It has two Objects, the immediate to 
which it is degenerately Secundan, the dynamic, to which it is genuinely Secundan 
[...] In its relation to its Immediate Object, it is a Vagosign if it represents that 
Object as possible, it is Actisign if it represents that Object as existent, it is General 
if it represents that Object as law. (MS 339, 247r, 1905 July 7)
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Th is is the classic division of propositions into particular, singular, and universal 
propositions. It is found in a logic book that Peirce knew very well, the Critique of 
Pure Reason. Kant’s table of judgments, upon which he is to ground the table of 
categories by a metaphysical deduction, includes a division of judgments according 
to their Quantity: Universal, Particular, and Singular (KrV, A 70, B 95). Here is Peirce’s 
dialogical and game-theoretical presentation of this trichotomy, without any appeal 
to the distinction between immediate and dynamic object being made:
If a sign is apt to represent many things, the option as to what single thing it shall 
be taken to represent may be reserved by the utterer of it, to whom it naturally 
belongs; in which case it may be said to be used vaguely, or not defi nitely. Th e 
utterer may, however, transfer this option to the interpreter; in which case the 
sign may be said to be used generally, or not individually. Obviously, the option 
cannot, in the same respect, at once lie with both parties. Hence, a sign cannot be 
at once vague and general in the same respect. It may, however, be both defi nite 
and individual; and in that case may be said to be used singularly. (MS 9, 2–3, c. 
1903)
A sign which is used vaguely or not defi nitely is one in which the subject is existentially 
quantifi ed, i.e. it is a particular proposition (“Some men are brave”); a sign which is used 
generally or not individually is one in which the subject is universally quantifi ed, i.e. 
it is an universal proposition (“All men are brave”); a sign which is both defi nite (not 
vague) and individual (not general) is used singularly, i.e. is a singular proposition (“Th is 
man / Socrates is brave”).14 On October 8, 1905 Peirce again presents a similar division 
of Signs according to the Immediate Object: as Vague Signs, which represent the object 
as Indefi nite; as Singular Signs, which represent the object as a Defi nite Individual; and 
as General Signs, which represent the object as Distributive general (MS 339, 252r). On 
October 10 he is most clear:
Signs are divisible according to their Objects. [...] According to their immediate 
objects. Th e immediate object is that object which the sign creates in representing it.
1. Th ere are signs of each of which the immediate object is only a possible 
presentment of a dynamic object, a fragment of it, the rest being held in reserve, so 
that there is nothing in the immediate object to prevent contradictory attributes 
being predicated of it. Th us “A certain man” may turn out to be rich. He may turn 
out to be poor. Such a sign may be termed an indefi nite sign.
2. Th ere are signs of which the immediate object holds nothing in reserve, by 
supplying which the utterer can aft erward limit it, nor allows any freedom of 
14 Pietarinen (2006) has shown how such dialogical or game-like characterization of the 
theory of quantifi cation explains the meaning of a quantifi er as determined by the interaction 
between the Utterer and the Interpreter of the proposition. Cf. also CP 3.479.
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interpretation, the immediate object precisely denoting the dynamical object. Such 
a sign is called a Singular Sign, a term in the use of which a certain latitude must 
be allowed, however; or else there will be no occasion on which it can be applied.
3. Th ere are signs of each of which the immediate object is represented as 
exchangeable for any existent within specifi ed or understood limits. Such may 
be termed a distributive sign. (MS 339, 256r)
Th e same division of propositions into particular, universal, and singular according to 
their immediate object is presented in various other places, among which are the 1905 
paper “Th e basis of pragmaticism” (MS 284, 54–64) and the 1906 National Academy 
of Sciences paper “On the system of existential graphs considered as an instrument for 
the investigation of logic” (MS 499; 499s, 10). From a “Provisional division of signs” 
recorded in the Logic Notebook and dated 1906 August 31 we learn that “according 
to the Form under which the Sign presents its Immediate Object” a sign may be an 
Indefi nite, a Designation, or a General (MS 339,  285r). We know that in the 1906 
“Prolegomena” Peirce writes that “we have to distinguish the Immediate Object, which 
is the Object as the Sign itself represents it, and whose Being is thus dependent upon 
the Representation of it in the Sign, from the Dynamical Object, which is the Reality 
which by some means contrives to determine the Sign to its Representation” (CP 
4.536). However, here Peirce does not spell out the details of the trichotomies resulting 
from his divisions. 
In fact Peirce’s taxonomic ambitions of 1903–1906 are put to rest in the immediately 
following years, to be resumed only between 1908 and 1909 (cf. MS 339, 360v, 1909). 
In a long letter to Lady Welby from December 1908 we read:
Th e Mediate Object is the object outside the Sign; I call it the Dynamoid Object. 
Th e Sign must indicate it by a hint; and this hint, or its substance, is the Immediate 
Object. [...] If the Immediate Object is a “Possible,” [...] I call the Sign a Descriptive; 
if the Immediate [Object] is an Occurrence, I call the Sign a Designative; and if 
the Immediate Object is a Necessitant, I call the Sign a Copulant; for in that case 
the Object has to be so identifi ed by the Interpreter that the Sign may represent a 
necessitation. My name is certainly a temporary expedient. (SS 84) 
In a variant draft  Peirce had written: “it is necessary to distinguish the Immediate 
Object, or the Object as the Sign represents it, from the Dynamical Object, or really 
effi  cient but not immediately present Object” (CP 8.343), aft er which he had presented 
the trichotomy into Descriptives, Designatives, and Copulants (CP 8.350). Th e dynamic 
object is not “immediately present” in the sign, i.e. is not part of the sign. Still, there 
must be a part of the sign which indicates or represents the dynamic object. Th is part 
deputed to indicate the dynamic object is the immediate object of the sign, which is in 
fact immediately present in, i.e. a part of, the sign itself. Peirce here off ers a diff erent 
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and admittedly obscure terminology for his trichotomy than the one presented in 
1904–1906. Th at the substance of his division is identical is, however, apparent from 
what he says of the Copulant sign: it is the interpreter of the Copulant sign which has 
the right to identify the object of the sign – which evidently corresponds to the earlier 
game-theoretical characterization of the universal quantifi er. If the 1908 Copulant 
sign corresponds to the 1905 General sign, or to some generalization of it,15 then it is 
reasonable to assume that Descriptives correspond to Vague signs and Designatives 
to Singular signs (Fig. 2). Given this identifi cation, we may with confi dence affi  rm 
that the trichotomy of signs according to their immediate objects, discovered in 1904, 
remains a relatively stable component of the subsequent classifi cations, and that the 
notion of immediate object is the instrument for the division of propositions according 
to what traditional logic calls their “quantity”.
“sign of quality, existent, or law”
L. Welby,  Oct. 1904
Vagosign, Actisign, General
MS 339, p. 247r, July 7 1905
Vague Signs, Singular Signs, General Signs
MS 339, p 252r, Oct. 8 1905
indefi nite, singular, distributive sign
MS 339, p 256r, Oct. 10 1905
Descriptives, Designatives and Copulants
L. Welby, Dec. 1908, CP 8.350
Figure 2. Th e trichotomy “according to the immediate object” 1904–1908.
15 In fact in November 1909 Peirce writes in the Logic Notebook: “Looking over the book 
labelled in red ‘Th e Prescott Book’, and also this one, I fi nd the entries in this book of ‘Provisional 
Classifi cation’ of 1906 March 31 and of 1905 Oct 13 particularly important from my present 
(accidentally limited, no doubt) point of view”. In both schemes the trichotomy according to 
the immediate object is into indefi nite, singular, and general, so he is implying that he judges 
this division to be somehow correct (thanks to Ahti Pietarinen for drawing attention to this 
later remark). Th at by 1907–1908 Peirce might have generalized and perhaps modifi ed his 
notion of the immediate object is not unlikely, and rather this would contribute to explaining 
why he is more inclined to talk of the “representative” and “ideal” nature of the immediate 
object in those years (thanks to Frederik Stjernfelt for discussing this point with me). But one 
thing is certain: the distinction must have a precise role in the classifi cation, and in 1904-1906 
this role is recognizably that of providing a typology of quantifi cation. No account of Peirce’s 
“immediate object” should neglect this fact.
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3. If this reconstruction, though certainly partial, is correct in substance, then I do 
not see why we should not accept the following statement concerning Peirce’s theory 
of signs: only propositions and proposition-like signs have immediate objects. All signs 
have dynamic objects; but not all signs have a part of themselves deputed to represent 
those objects, that is, not all signs have an immediate object. Peirce is very clear that 
the immediate object has nothing to do with the meaning of the sign, but with its 
denotation. When he writes that the immediate object is “the object as represented 
by the sign”, what he means is the object as “represented (indicated, denoted) in one 
part of the sign”. So he writes to William James on March 14, 1909:
For instance, suppose I awake in the morning before my wife, and that aft erwards 
she wakes up and inquires, “What sort of a day is it?” Th is is a sign, whose Object, as 
expressed, is the weather at that time, but whose Dynamical Object is the impression 
which I have presumably derived from peeping between the window-curtains. […] 
I reply, let us suppose, “It is a stormy day”. Here is another sign. Its Immediate Object 
is the notion of the present weather so far as this is common to her mind and mine – 
not the character of it, but the identity of it. Th e Dynamical Object is the identity of 
the actual or Real meteorological conditions at the moment. (CP 8.314)
Th e dynamic object of the Peirce’s reply “It is a stormy day” is the real meteorological 
condition. Its immediate object is the reference made within the sign to the dynamic 
object, the way in which the sign indicates that object. It is the subject “it”, or any other 
means the sign has to make reference to the present subject of discourse, or to select 
it from the universe of discourse. A particular assertion contains an instruction as 
to how to make the selection, a universal contains a diff erent instruction; they have 
diff erent immediate objects. Immediate objects are means of reference. Anything 
that belongs or has any role in the determination of the reference of a sign, is part of 
its immediate object:
A man, tramping along a weary and solitary road, meets an individual of strange 
mien, who says, “Th ere was a fi re in Megara.” If this should happen in the Middle 
United States, there might very likely be some village in the neighborhood called 
Megara. Or it may refer to one of the ancient cities of Megara, or to some romance. 
And the time is wholly indefi nite. In short, nothing at all is conveyed, until the 
person addressed asks, “Where?” – “Oh about half a mile along there” pointing 
to whence he came. “And when?” “As I passed.” Now an item of information has 
been conveyed, because it has been stated relatively to a well-understood common 
experience. (CSP to LW, SS, p. 197, March 9, 1906)
Immediate objects account for the intersubjectivity of reference. A sign functions 
as such if it identifi es an object that is common to the utterer’s and the interpreter’s 
experiences. In Peirce’s example of his wife asking about the weather, the present 
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meteorological condition is the dynamic object of the sign; the reference to that 
present condition, in so far as the Peirces have in mind the same portion of the dynamic 
object and refer to it in conversation – and the sign must make some such reference 
in order to convey the information it professes to convey – that intersubjective 
reference is the immediate object of the sign. “Th e character of it”, its being a stormy 
day (or in the example of Megara, there being a fi re) is not part of the object, but 
part of the interpretant: is what the sign says of the present condition, aft er having 
identifi ed it. 
Now a sign which in addition to saying something also indicates that of which it 
says what it says, must have a propositional size; for this is exactly how Peirce defi nes 
a proposition, for example in this letter to Christine Ladd-Franklin:
Now a symbol may have such a relation to its object that it does not determine what 
the interpretant is to be. If it does determine that interpretant it is an argument. 
Its interpretant is its conclusion. If it does not do so, it still needs some application 
in an interpretant to give it any signifi cation, but it does not specify what that 
interpretant or what that application is to be. In that case it may determine what 
its object is to be, & not merely leave it to be whatever it may be. In that case it 
asseverates, that is, it is either true or false, and is called a proposition (CSP to CLF, 
MS L 237, 1901)
“A sign separately or independently indicating its object” is what Hilpinen (1992: 
473) has aptly called the “standard defi nition” of a proposition, which is found, e.g., 
in the New List of 1867 (CP 1.559), in Baldwin’s Dictionary (CP 2.357, 1901), in the 
Harvard Lectures of 1903 (CP 5.76, 5.139, 1903), in the Syllabus (MS 478, CP 2.311, 
1903) and in Καινὰ Στοιχεῖα (MS 517, 1904). Th e defi nition has a contrastive purpose: 
propositions diff er form arguments in that the latter not only separately represent 
the object, but also separately represent the interpretant (the conclusion); but most 
importantly for our present purpose, propositions diff er from predicates or rhemes, 
for a rheme does not separately represent its object, but merely leaves that object 
indefi nite. To say that a sign separately represents its own object is to say that it has such 
a structure as to involve, as a separate part of it, a representation of that object. But as 
soon as a sign has such a minimal structure, i.e. as soon as it has a separate part of it 
deputed to represent the object, that sign is a proposition. In the post-1904 semiotic 
terminology, as soon as a sign has a part deputed to indicate the dynamic object, this 
part being called the immediate object of the sign, that sign is a proposition.16 Hilpinen’s 
16 Th e objection may be raised that Peirce’s vague signs, general signs, etc. are predicates, 
e.g. “some man”, “all men”, etc., and not propositions, like “some man is brave”, “all men are 
brave”, etc. Th e reply is, though, that Peirce’s own analysis of the proposition suggests distinct 
separation of the quantifi ed (Hopkinsian) part from the predicative or rhematic (Boolean) part. 
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standard defi nition may thus be reformulated: a proposition is a sign that has an 
immediate object. 
An immediate consequence of this is that immediate objects are not accumulative; 
rather, they are mutually exclusive: a proposition is either particular or universal, 
but not both. On the contrary, the historical Leibniz has both the colour of the 
skin represented in the painting and the physique represented in the statue, these 
“immediate objects” being not mutually exclusive but rather accumulative. All the 
things that the diff erent signs of Leibniz can communicate to us, are characters of 
Leibniz, and thus interpretants, not objects, of those signs. But in so far as those 
signs have a part deputed to indicate that of which they are signs (e.g., the painting 
has a legend, the statue an incision), they behave like propositions (typically, singular 
propositions: “Leibniz was such and such”). “Meanings” are in the above sense 
accumulative (when considered as characters), but it makes little or no sense to claim 
that denotation is accumulative in the same sense.
As noted in Section 1, following the Fregean and stoic interpretation of Peirce’s 
distinction between the immediate and the dynamic objects would require us to treat 
the immediate object as Frege’s Sinn and the Stoics’ λεκτόν of a signifi cant expression. 
In turn, since Frege’s Sinn may be either saturated or unsaturated, and the Stoics’ 
λεκτόν either complete or incomplete, this would require us to look for a similar 
distinction in Peirce between complete and incomplete immediate objects. Now, it 
has emerged that the distinction that Peirce in fact makes is that between complete 
and incomplete signs, not between complete and incomplete objects of signs. He does 
distinguish between complete signs or propositions and incomplete signs or rhemes in 
terms of the immediate object: proposition-like signs are those that have an immediate 
object, while rheme-like signs are those that lack an immediate object. According 
to the Fregean interpretation, however, all signs have immediate objects (complete if 
they are propositions, incomplete if they are terms). According to my reconstruction, 
only propositions have immediate objects, and propositions diff erent in quantity have 
diff erent immediate objects (vague, singular, or general). Th e contrast is evident: if all 
signs are to have immediate objects, as the Fregean interpretation implies, then the 
1904–1908 trichotomies “according to the immediate object” should be divisions of all 
signs. But not all signs have quantity, at least according to Peirce; rhemes, for example, 
have not. Th is seems to me an insurmountable diffi  culty for the Fregean interpretation.
I claim that my interpretation is supported by textual evidence, while the Fregean 
interpretation is not. In Section 2 I have reported the steps by which Peirce introduces 
the immediate/dynamic object distinction in the classifi cation of signs. Although 
Peirce’s own characterization of the distinction is obscure and sometimes even 
Also, rhemes are classifi ed according to a more characteristic parameter (valency; compare the 
schemes of MS 284, 1905, and MS 499s, 1906, with MS 339, 285r, 1906).
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confusing, the way he uses this distinction in his grammatical discussions, the apparent 
immediate purpose for which it is introduced, and the eff ects of its introduction for 
the classifi cation of signs, can hardly leave any doubt that the notion of immediate 
object is intended to account for the dimension of reference within a quantifi cational 
theory of propositions.17
References
Atkin, Albert 2008. Peirce’s fi nal account of signs and the philosophy of language. Transactions 
of the Charles S. Peirce Society 44(1): 63–85.
Beaney, Michael 1996. Frege: Making Sense. London: Duckworth.
Bellucci, Francesco 2014. ‘Logic, considered as Semeiotic’: On Peirce’s philosophy of logic. 
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 50(4): 523–547.
Bergman, Mats 2008. Peirce’s Philosophy of Communication. London: Continuum.
Deledalle, Gérard 2000. Charles S. Peirce’s Philosophy of Signs: Essays in Comparative Semiotics. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Eco, Umberto 1976. Peirce’s notion of interpretant. MLN 91(6): 1457–1472.
–  1979. Lector in fabula. Milano: Bompiani.
–  1984. Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language. London: Macmillan.
Frege, Gottlob 1879. Begriff sschrift , eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des 
reinen Denkens. Halle: Nebert.
–  1960. Philosophical Writings. (Geach, Peter T.; Black, Max, eds.) Oxford: Blackwell.
Gaskin, Richard 2008. Th e Unity of the Proposition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hilpinen, Risto 1992. On Peirce’s philosophical logic: Propositions and their objects. 
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 28: 467–488.
Kant, Immanuel 1781[1787]. Kritik der reinen Vernunft . Riga: Hartknoch. [KrV]
Macbeth, Danielle 2005. Frege’s Logic. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Manetti, Giovanni 1987. Le teorie del segno nell’antichità classica. Milano: Bompiani.
Mates, Benson 1953. Stoic Logic. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Pape, Helmut 1990. Charles S. Peirce on objects of thought and representation. Noûs 24(3): 
375–395. 
Peirce, Charles Sanders 1931–1958. (Hartshorne, Charles; Weiss, Paul, eds. 1931–1935; Burks, 
Arthur W., ed. 1958.) Th e Collected Papers of Charles S. Peirce. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. [In-text references are to CP, followed by volume and paragraph numbers.] 
–  1976. Th e New Elements of Mathematics by Charles S. Peirce. (4 vols., Eisele, Carolyn, ed.) 
Th e Hague: Mouton. [In-text references are to NEM]
17 Research supported by Estonian Research Council Project PUT 267: Diagrammatic Mind: 
Logical and Communicative Aspects of Iconicity; PI Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen. Th is paper was 
written during my stay at Centro Ricerche Porto Conte, Alghero, in February 2015; I wish to 
express my gratitude to Andrea Galante and Paolo De Vita for their support and friendship. 
Many thanks also to Helmut Pape, Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, and Frederik Stjernfelt for im-
portant grammatical discussions. 
 Exploring Peirce’s speculative grammar: The immediate object of a sign  415
–  1977. Semiotic and Signifi cs. Th e Correspondence between Charles S. Peirce and Victoria 
Lady Welby. (Hardwick, Charles S., ed.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press. [In-text 
reference are to SS]. 
Pietarinen, Ahti-Veikko 2006. Signs of Logic. Dordrecht: Springer. 
Robin, Richard S. 1967. Annotated Catalogue of the Papers of Charles S. Peirce. Amherst: 
University of Massachusetts Press. [In-text references are to MS.]
Short, Th omas L. 2007. Peirce’s Th eory of Signs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stjernfelt, Frederik 2014. Natural Propositions. Boston: Docent Press.
Изучая спекулятивную грамматику Пирса: 
Непосредственный объект знака
Автор статьи критикует интерпретацию в духе Фреге пирсовского соотношения 
между динамическим и непосредственным объектами знака, где первый уподобляется 
фрегевскому Bedeutung, а второй – фрегевскому Sinn. После критического разбора автор 
реконструирует происхождение понятия непосредственного объекта в работах Пирса 
1904–1909 годов и отстаивает точку зрения, что, согласно Пирсу, непосредственные 
объекты есть только у пропозиции.
Peirce’i spekulatiivset grammatikat uurides: 
Märgi vahetu objekt
Artiklis vaieldakse vastu sellele, mida nimetan Peirce’i poolt märgi vahetu ja dünaamilise 
objekti vahele tehtud eristuse fregelikuks tõlgendamiseks ja mille kohaselt on Peirce’i 
dünaamiline objekt sarnane Frege mõistega Bedeutung, vahetu objekt aga Frege mõistega 
Sinn. Pärast fregeliku tõlgenduse kriitilist käsitlemist rekonstrueerin lühidalt vahetu objekti 
mõiste väljakujunemise Peirce’i semiootika-alastes kirjutistes aastatel 1904–1909 ning kaitsen 
seisukohta, et Peirce’i järgi on vahetud objektid üksnes propositsioonidel.
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COMMENT 
Helmut Pape18
Perhaps the most problematic feature of the paper by Francesco Bellucci is that the author, 
although he attacks the “Fregean interpretation” of the immediate object and the distinction 
between sense and reference, sticks to the strict divide of conceptual functions which Frege’s 
distinction implies. Th at is to say, he does not ask whether this pair of concepts is adequate to 
capture Peirce’s notion of pragmatic access conditions for the “unexpressed” objects of a sign. 
However, Peirce’s concept of an immediate object is designed to capture the cognitive paths and 
conditions by which we are able to access and grasp those feature which determine the correct 
interpretation of signs. Even earlier, before introducing the immediate/dynamical distinction 
in 1903, and developing it explicitly in MS 318 in 1908, Peirce argued that cognitive access to 
“what we talk” about depends on the way how causal cognitive processes are related to language:
It would, certainly, in one sense be extravagant to say that we can never tell what 
we are talking about; yet, in another sense, it is quite true. Th e meanings of words 
ordinarily depend upon our tendencies to weld together qualities and our aptitudes 
to see resemblances, or, to use the received phrase, upon associations by similarity; 
while experience is bound together, and only recognisable, by forces acting upon 
us, or, to use an even worse chosen technical term, by means of associations by 
contiguity. (CP 3.419, 1895)
Th e author argues convincingly for the view that only assertions may have immediate objects. 
His reasoning sets out from the somewhat general but correct claim that “both dynamic and 
immediate objects are on the denotative side” of signs. Th e thesis of the author about what 
immediate objects are – which he did not explicitly state – is that they can be characterized 
by quantifi ers. Th is surely gives us a partial, formal feature of immediate objects – but only 
of them and not of the dynamical object. Th en why does Peirce stress, time and again, that in 
the case of the immediate object the equality of properties is decisive, whereas only in the case 
of the dynamical objects are we concerned with identity? A crucial question therefore is what 
function does the equality feature of immediate objects have. What does it contribute to the 
“denotative side” of signs in the semiotic relation? Why do we need immediate objects at all, if 
identity and therefore quantifi cation are related to the dynamical object? Th ese questions and 
the diffi  culties should be discussed with the notion of an object in general in Peirce’s semiotics 
as a background. For Peirce points out that ‘object’ is a complex concept: 
[t]hat the common use of the word “object” to mean a thing, is altogether incorrect. 
Th e noun objectum came into use in the XIIIth century, as a term of psychology. 
It means primarily that creation of the mind in its reaction with a more or less 
real something, which creation becomes that upon which cognition is directed; and 
secondarily, an object is that upon which an exertion acts; also that which a purpose 
seeks to bring about; also, that which is coupled with something else in a relation, and 
18 Author’s address: Universität Bamberg, An der Universität 2, D-96047 Bamberg, Germany; 
e-mail: helmut_pape@web.de.
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more especially is represented as so coupled; also, that to which any sign corresponds. 
(MS 693A, 33, 1904)
However, the paper does not address any of these issues. In fact, the author seems to imply that 
any concept of an object must be understood as to be directly and extensionally referential, 
excluding any contributory function of how the object is to be cognitively determined. Th e 
paper does not address any of those features that Peirce connected with the relation between 
a sign and its pragmatic, that is to say perceptual/experiential factors, that determine how 
objects are accessed. For instance, the objects to which cognition is directed and to which a sign 
corresponds are of course related to one another. What about the hypothesis that the notion of 
the immediate object was designed by Peirce to capture this feature of semiotic cognition? To 
see how close the relation between semiotic cognition and the immediate object was for Peirce, 
let us look at a passage in which Peirce explains his immediate/dynamical object distinction:
Take for example, the sentence the Sun is blue. “Its Objects are “the Sun” and 
“blueness.” If by “blueness” be meant the Immediate Object, which is the quality 
of the sensation, it can only be known by Feeling. But if it means that “Real,” 
existential condition, which causes the emitted light to have short mean wave-length, 
Langley has already proved that the proposition is true. So the “Sun” may mean 
the occasion of sundry sensations, and so is Immediate Object, or it may mean 
our usual interpretation of such sensations in terms of place, of mass, etc., when it 
is the Dynamical Object. It is true of both Immediate and Dynamical Object that 
acquaintance cannot be given by a Picture or a Description, nor by any other sign 
which has the Sun for its Object. (CP 8.183)
In Peirce’s most extensive and carefully argued text on the object of a sign in MS 318 one of his 
pragmatic theses is that the object is unexpressed by the sign – “taken by itself”. Of course, this 
pragmatic thesis holds for both the immediate and the dynamical object. If you look at the way 
the immediate/dynamical object distinction varies in CP 8.183 it seems to be obvious that the 
cognitive and causal factors in the situation of utterance may be addressed in diff erent ways, 
each way giving rise to diff erent pragmatic paths and conditions of interpreting a sentence 
like “Th e sun is blue” correctly. Th is shows that the immediate/dynamical distinction is a 
pragmatic, and that is to a rhetorical one. 
Th e immediate/dynamical object distinction plays a pragmatic role and is not a distinction 
restricted to speculative grammar. Th e author does not consider that all the examples he 
gives and the analysis of immediate objects in terms of quantifi cational burdens of proof 
distributed between the author and the interpreter of an assertion assigns a rhetorical function 
to immediate objects. In the case of proper names, Pietarinen 2010 has already shown that 
Peirce did not believe in Fregean reference that is determined by sense. However, the view that 
objects are rather pragmatically determined and diff erentiated by those causal and equality 
conditions is implied by the passage from CP 3.419 quoted above: perceptions, associations 
of ideas act as causal and rhetorical conditions. Th ey bring it about that for us objects may 
“immediately” become part and parcel of dialogical sign processes, for only if my immediate 
object “sun” is the same as yours do we talk about the same issue. Th is, by the way, also explains 
why all of Peirce’s sign defi nitions insist that the object determines the interpretant.
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To sum up, I think the author correctly stresses that “immediate object” does not 
conceptualize sense or connotation. However, he ignores the pragmatic, that is, non-
connotative, causal role which feelings, perceptions, associations and “ideas” have and which 
make up the pragmatic dimension of their practical, rhetorical role. Th is causal, path-opening 
role of ideas, feelings, etc. belongs to the very core of the semantic thought of Peirce who arrived 
at semantics via the pragmatic, the rhetorical. Th e concept of an immediate object is part and 
parcel of a family of semantic-pragmatic concepts related to the notion of the universe of 
discourse. Th is concept, adapted by Peirce from George Boole, is used e.g. in An Investigation of 
the Laws of Th ought. For Boole, to have the same universe of discourse means that people agree 
in their thoughts or their “intercourse with others” (Boole 1854: 53) on the sort of objects they 
talk about; we are able to determine a common universe of discourse only because we engage 
in a rhetorical, selective activity using sensual or associative ideas or properties selectively. 
When we limit the fi eld of discourse, he argued, “the operation which we really perform is one 
of selection according to a prescribed principle or idea” (Boole 1854: 43). Boole, like Peirce, 
was not interested in the psychological side of processes that we undergo when we perform 
this task. Rather, he insists that e.g. in using terms “to select mentally from the class of men all 
those who possess the further quality ‘good’”, we perform a kind of operation logically diff erent 
from that of ascribing predicates to class members. Th e selective use of properties requires 
attention and imagination rather than rational judgment about propositions. Not only Peirce’s 
use of ‘universe of discourse’, but his stress on common experience has its roots in Boole’s 
rhetorical method. For Boole (1854: 44) points out: “Every name, every term of description that 
we employ, directs him who we address to the performance of a certain mental operation of 
that subject. And thus thought is communicated.” So it is obvious that Peirce’s use of ‘universe 
of discourse’ requires the semantical role common experience and subliminal perception. And 
this also constitutes the cognitive conditions for various immediate objects which therefore 
goes back to Boole too. Th e notion of an immediate object has its roots right here: for what 
can be more immediate – Peirce defi nes the immediate as being without a boundary – than 
an object determined by cognitive processes? which pragmatically select relative to a sign and 
which thereby force attention to some object without involving any conscious involvement?19
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